Philippine Inter-fashion, Inc. v NLRC case digest

G.R. No. L-59847 October 18, 1982

PHILIPPINES INTER-FASHION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SHERIFF'S OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AND NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), respondents.

Facts:

Phil. Inter-fashion, Inc. decided to retrench its employees and selected about 40 employees to be dismissed due to lack of work. The day after the company informed about 20 of the affected employees regarding the plan, around 200 employees went to the Ministry of Labor and talked with then Deputy Minister who advised them to return to their work. They actually returned but did not work. The following day, the workers returned to their work with the return-to-work order but the company did not allow them to work.

Issues:

1. WoN the petitioner must be deemed to have waived its right to pursue the case of illegal strike against the 114 employees who were not reinstated and who pursued their illegal lockout claim against petitioner

2. WoN the said 114 employees are entitled to reinstatement with three months' backwages.

Held:

1. There was no clear and unequivocal waiver on the part of petitioner and on the contrary the record shows that it tenaciously pursued its application for their dismissal.

2. In view of the undisputed findings of illegal strike on the part of the 114 employees and illegal lockout on petitioner's part, both parties are in pari delicto and such situation warrants the restoration of the status quo ante and bringing the parties back to the respective positions before the illegal strike and illegal lockout through the reinstatement of the said 114 employees.

Ratio:

1. The Bisaya case (102 Phil. 438) is inapplicable to the present case. xxx if petitioner really had any intention to pardon the 114 strikers, it would have included them in its motion to withdraw on November 17, 1980. The fact that it did not, but instead continued to pursue the case to the end, simply means that it did not pardon the, 114 strikers.

2. The finding of illegal strike was not disputed. xxx On the other hard, the finding of illegal lockout was likewise not, disputed. xxx The findings show that both petitioner and the 114 strikers are in pari delicto, a situation which warrants the maintenance of the status quo. This means that the contending parties must be brought back to their respective positions before the controversy; that is, before the strike. Therefore, the order reinstating the 114 employees is proper.

PRISCO v CIR case digest

Price Stabilization Corporation vs Court of Industrial Relations and PRISCO’s Worker Union

 (GR No. L-13806, May 23, 1960)

Facts:

PRISCO Worker's Union (the union) filed with the CIR a petition praying that PRISCO beordered to pay its present employees to pay its present employees, claimants-membersof the said Union, (1) their basic pay and at least 25 per cent additional compensation forone hour overtime work they had previously rendered as security guards of petitioner,from April 17, 1953 to January 13, 1954, and (2) the additional compensation of at least25 per cent for the work they have been rendering on Sundays and legal holidays, fromMarch 7, 1954 and on.PRISCO filed an answer denying Union's claim and asserted that such overtime, ifrendered, was not authorized; some claimants that had rendered work in Sundays andlegal holidays had already been paid; and that some claims have been withdrawn.CIR - issued an order requiring petitioner to pay the claimants, members of the Union,their basic pay and 25 percent additional compensation for one hour overtime work theyhad rendered from April 16, 1953 to January 13, 1954 (to the security guards). However,for lack of evidence and some claimants withdrawing their claim for pay for workperformed on Sundays and legal holidays, the court dismissed this second claim.Petitioner filed for motion of reconsideration but was denied (3 voted for denial - 2 votedto set aside the order due to lack of jurisdiction by the court)

Issues:

1) Whether the CIR has jurisdiction over the present claim

2) Whether the CIR correctly applied Articles 1393 and 1396 of the New Civil Code to the case

Held:

CIR decision affirmed

Ratio:

1) In the case of PAFLU vs Tan, the CIR has jurisdiction over cases when: the disputeaffects an industry which is indispensable in the national interest and is so certified by thePresident to the industrial court, when the controversy refers to the minimum wage underthe Minimum Wage Law, when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-HourLabor Law, and when it involves an unfair labor practice. In the case of Detective andProtective Bureau Incorporated vs Felipe Guevarra, et al, the Court held that the CIR has jurisdiction inasmuch as the claimants were all employees at the time of the filing of theirclaims.One significant principle in determining CIR's jurisdiction is that where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be reestablished because of its wrongful severance, the CIR has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or inconnection with employment. After the termination of the relationship and noreinstatement is sought, such claims become mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. In the present case, the claimants are, or at least were,at the time of presenting their claims, actually in the employ of PRISCO, therefore the CIRcorrectly took cognizance of the case.

2) In this case, the security guards who were employed were divided into three shifts of 8hours each. They received a memorandum from the Assistant Chief Security Officer ofPRISCO, directing them to reports for duty 2 hours in advance, until the order wasrevoked after a change of management. Petitioner contends that the said memorandum was issued without authority and they are not bound to pay for the alleged overtime.CIR found that after the enforcement of the memorandum, the guards protested to themanagement and instead of revoking said memorandum on the grounds that it wasunauthorized, General Manager De la Cruz told the guards why it was being enforced,being a was to discipline them and that their work was only light and that 1 hour is of noimportance. CIR held that it amounted to a tacit ratification of the memorandum, andapplying Articles 1393 and 1396 of the New Civil Code, that any defect in thememorandum was corrected by that ratification. Petitioner urges that these articles referto voidable contracts.SC states that a contract of employment exists between parties. When the guards wererequired to render an additional hour work, and complying (non-compliance waspunishable by disciplinary action), a supplemental contractual obligation was created bothunder the terms of the original contract of employment and of the Eight-Hour Labor Law,that such additional work was to be compensated. The memorandum was originallyauthorized and was not illegal to the extent of not being capable of ratification by theGeneral manager. Therefore, the CIR correctly applied Articles 1393 and 1396.Article 1393. Ratification may be effected expressly or tacitly. It is understood that thereis a tacit ratification if, with knowledge of the reason which renders the contract voidableand such reason having ceased, the person who has a right to invoke it should executean act which necessarily implies an intention to waive his right. (1311a)Article 1396. Ratification cleanses the contract from all its defects from the moment it wasconstituted. (1313)

Source: SCRIBD: Published by Ida Chua

Conspiracy

Conspiracy; Complex Crime with Rape (1996)

Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning, robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were living. While the four were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house, Fernando, noticing that one of Danilo's daughters was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her in a thicket somewhat distant from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to the house, raped her first. Thereafter, the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his family.

a) What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and Fernando commit? Explain. 

b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the latter's house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what crime did the four commit? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed complex crime of Robbery with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner the offenders committed the robbery but the rape was committed by Fernando at a place "distant from the house" where the robbery was committed, not in the presence of the other conspirators. Hence, Fernando alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable for the special complex crime. (People vs. Canturia et. al, G.R. 108490, 22 June 1995}

b) The crime would be Robbery with Homicide ...

(implied: there is still conspiracy)

Conspiracy; Flight to Evade Apprehension (2003)

A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their employer C at midnight and take the money kept in the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch of the store, where they knew C would be sleeping, and planned the sequence of their attack. Shortly before midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the plan. When A was about to lift C's mosquito net to thrust his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out of the store and fled, while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in the bag, and ran outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left the place. What was the participation and corresponding criminal liability of each, if any? Reasons. 8%

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

There was an expressed conspiracy between A and B to kill C and take the latter's money. The planned killing and taking of the money appears to be intimately related as component crimes, hence a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The conspiracy being expressed, not just implied, A and B are bound as co-conspirators after they have planned and agreed on the sequence of their attack even before they committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in law that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, already governs them. In fact, A and B were already in the store to carry out their criminal plan.

That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the sirens of the police car, is not spontaneous desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if B then tried to stop A from continuing with the commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and commenced to commit, would also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both are liable for the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

A shall incur full criminal liability for the crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall not incur criminal liability because he desisted. B's spontaneous desistance, made before all acts of execution are performed, is exculpatory. Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se punishable.

The desistance need not be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the discontinuance comes from the person who has begun the commission of the crime but before all acts of execution are performed. A person who has began the commission of a crime but desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a reward to one, who having set foot on the verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and returns to the path of righteousness.

Conspiracy; Implied Conspiracy (1998) 

What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy? [3%] 

SUGGESTED ANSWER: 

The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons participating in the commission of a crime collectively responsible and liable as co-conspirators although absent any agreement to that effect, when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a common purpose or objective. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or deduced from their criminal participation in pursuing the crime and thus the act of one shall be deemed the act of all. 

Conspiracy; Implied Conspiracy; Effects (2003) 

State the concept of "implied conspiracy" and give its legal effects. 4% 

SUGGESTED ANSWER: 

An "IMPLIED CONSPIRACY" is one which is only inferred or deduced from the manner the participants in the commission of crime carried out its execution. Where the offenders acted in concert in the commission of the crime, meaning that their acts are coordinated or synchronized in a way indicative that they are pursuing a common criminal objective, they shall be deemed to be acting in conspiracy and their criminal liability shall be collective, not individual. 

The legal effects of an "implied conspiracy" are: 

a) Not all those who are present at the scene of the crime will be considered conspirators; 

b) Only those who participated by criminal acts in the commission of the crime will be considered as co- conspirators; and 

c) Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission of the crime, without any act of criminal participation, shall not render one criminally liable as co-conspirator. 

Criminal Liability: Destructive Arson (2000) 

A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded to the house of X. Y, a neighbor of X, who happened to be passing by, pointed to the four culprits the room that X occupied. The four culprits peppered the room with bullets. Unsatisfied, A even threw a hand grenade that totally destroyed X's room. However, unknown to the four culprits, X was not inside the room and nobody was hit or injured during the Incident. Are A, B, C and D liable for any crime? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. A, B. C and D are liable for destructive arson because of the destruction of the room of X with the use of an explosive, the hand grenade. Liability for an impossible crime is to be imposed only if the act committed would not constitute any other crime under the Revised Penal Code. Although the facts involved are parallel to the case of Intod vs. Court of Appeals (215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that the liability of the offender was for an impossible crime, no hand grenade was used in said case, which constitutes a more serious crime though different from what was intended,

Criminal Liability: Felonious Act of Scaring (1996)

Alexander, an escaped convict, ran amuck on board a Superlines Bus bound for Manila from Bicol and killed ten (10) persons. Terrified by the incident, Carol and Benjamin who are passengers of the bus, jumped out of the window and while lying unconscious after hitting the pavement of the road, were ran over and crushed to death by a fast moving Desert Fox bus tailing the Superlines Bus.

Can Alexander be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin although he was completely unaware that the two jumped out of the bus? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Alexander can be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin because of felonious act of running was the proximate cause of the victim's death. The rule is that when a person, by a felonious act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to escape from or avoid such danger and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the felonious act is responsible for such injuries or death.

(US vs. Valdez, 41 Phil, 1497; People vs. Apra, 27 SCRA 1037.)

Criminal Liability: Felonious Act; Proximate Cause (1996)

Vicente hacked Anacleto with a bolo but the latter was able to parry it with his hand, causing upon him a two- inch wound on his right palm. Vicente was not able to hack Anacleto further because three policemen arrived and threatened to shoot Vicente if he did not drop his bolo. Vicente was accordingly charged by the police at the prosecutor's office for attempted homicide. Twenty- five days later, while the preliminary investigation was in progress, Anacleto was rushed to the hospital because of symptoms of tetanus infection on the two-inch wound inflicted by Vicente. Anacleto died the following day.

Can Vicente be eventually charged with homicide for the death of Anacleto? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Vicente may be charged of homicide for the death of Anacleto, unless the tetanus infection which developed twenty five days later, was brought about by an efficient supervening cause. Vicente's felonious act of causing a two-inch wound on Anacleto's right palm may still be regarded as the proximate cause of the latter's death because without such wound, no tetanus infection could develop from the victim's right palm, and without such tetanus infection the victim would not have died with it.

FELONIES

Conspiracy (1997)

A had a grudge against F. Deciding to kill F, A and his friends, B, C, and D, armed themselves with knives and proceeded to the house of F, taking a taxicab for the purpose. About 20 meters from their destination, the group alighted and after instructing E, the driver, to wait, traveled on foot to the house of F. B positioned himself at a distance as the group's lookout. C and D stood guard outside the house. Before A could enter the house, D left the scene without the knowledge of the others. A stealthily entered the house and stabbed F. F ran to the street but was blocked by C, forcing him to flee towards another direction. Immediately after A had stabbed F, A also stabbed G who was visiting F. Thereafter, A exiled from the house and, together with B and C, returned to the waiting taxicab and motored away.

G died. F survived.

Who are liable for the death of G and the physical injuries of F?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The object of the conspiracy of A. B, C, and D was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not know of the stabbing of G by A, they cannot be held criminally therefor. E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G since the former was completely unaware of said killing.

For the physical injuries of F, A, B and C. should be held liable therefore. Even if it was only A who actually stabbed and caused physical injuries to G, B and C are nonetheless liable for conspiring with A and for contributing positive acts which led to the realization of a common criminal intent. B positioned himself as a lookout, while C blocked F's escape. D, however, although part of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable because he left the scene before A could enter the house where the stabbing occurred. Although he was earlier part of the conspiracy, he did not personally participate in the execution of the crime by acts which directly tended toward the same end (People vs. Tomoro, et al 44 Phil. 38),



In the same breath, E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the infliction of physical injuries upon F because there is no showing that he had knowledge of the plan to kill F.



Conspiracy; Avoidance of Greater Evil (2004)


BB and CC, both armed with knives, attacked FT. The victim's son, ST, upon seeing the attack, drew his gun but was prevented from shooting the attackers by AA, who grappled with him for possession of the gun. FT died from knife wounds. AA, BB and CC were charged with murder.

In his defense, AA invoked the justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury, contending that by preventing ST from shooting BB and CC, he merely avoided a greater evil.


Will AA's defense prosper? Reason briefly. (5%)


SUGGESTED ANSWER:


No, AA's defense will not prosper because obviously there was a conspiracy among BB, CC and AA, such that the principle that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, shall govern. The act of ST, the victim's son, appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence, justified as a defense of his father against the unlawful aggression by BB and CC. ST's act to defend his father's life, cannot be regarded as an evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a lawful act.


What AA did was to stop a lawful defense, not greater evil, to allow BB and CC achieve their criminal objective of stabbing FT.



Conspiracy; Co-Conspirator (1998)

Juan and Arturo devised a plan to murder Joel. In a narrow alley near Joel's house, Juan will hide behind the big lamppost and shoot Joel when the latter passes through on his way to work. Arturo will come from the other end of the alley and simultaneously shoot Joel from behind. On the appointed day, Arturo was apprehended by the authorities before reaching the alley. When Juan shot Joel as planned, he was unaware that Arturo was arrested earlier. Discuss the criminal liability of Arturo, if any. [5%]


SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to murder Joel, thereby becomes a co-principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt act and both will incur criminal liability. Arturo's liability as a conspirator arose from his participation in jointly devising the criminal plan with Juan, to kill Jose. And it was pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan killed Joel. The conspiracy here is actual, not by inference only. The overt act was done pursuant to that conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-conspirator. There being a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore, should be liable as a co-conspirator but the penalty on him may be that of an accomplice only (People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1; People us. Medrano, 114 SCRA 335) because he was not able to actually participate in the shooting of Joel, having been apprehended before reaching the place where the crime was committed.



ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:



Arturo is not liable because he was not able to participate in the killing of Joel. Conspiracy itself is not punishable unless expressly provided by law and this is not true in the case of Murder. A co-conspirator must perform an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy.



Conspiracy: Common Felonious Purpose (1994)



At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy were walking along Padre Faura Street, Manila. Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result. Dino died, Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were charged with homicide.


Is there conspiracy in this case?


SUGGESTED ANSWER:


Yes, there is conspiracy among the offenders, as manifested by their concerted actions against the victims, demonstrating a common felonious purpose of assaulting the victims. The existence of the conspiracy can be inferred or deduced from the manner the offenders acted in commonly attacking Dino and Raffy with rocks, thereby demonstrating a unity of criminal design to inflict harm on their victims.

General Principles

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

General Principles; Schools of thought in Criminal Law (1996)

1. What are the different schools of thought or theories in Criminal Law and describe each briefly.

2. To what theory does our Revised Penal Code belong?


SUGGESTED ANSWER:


1. There are two schools of thought in Criminal Law, and these are (a) the CLASSICAL THEORY, which simply means that the basis of criminal liabilities is human free will, and the purpose of the penalty is retribution which must be proportional to the gravity of the offense; and (b) the POSITIVIST THEORY, which considers man as a social being and his acts are attributable not just to his will but to other forces of society. As such, punishment is not the solution, as he is not entirely to be blamed; law and jurisprudence should not be the yardstick in the imposition of sanction, instead the underlying reasons would be inquired into.


2. We follow the classical school of thought although some provisions of eminently positivist in tendencies, like punishment of impossible crime, Juvenile circumstances, are incorporated in our Code.


General Principles; Territoriality (1994)

Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna.


1) Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy?


SUGGESTED ANSWER:


1) No, Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the bigamous marriage was contracted or solemnized in Singapore, hence such violation is not one of those where the Revised Penal Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied extraterritorially. The general rule on territoriality of criminal law governs the situation.

General Principles; Territoriality; Jurisdiction over Vessel (2000)

After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel beer and taking two plates of "pulutan", Binoy, a Filipino seaman, stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V "Princess of the Pacific", an overseas vessel which was sailing in the South China Sea. The vessel, although Panamanian registered, is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino businessman. When M/V "Princess of the Pacific" reached a Philippine Port at Cebu City, the Captain of the vessel turned over the assailant Binoy to the Philippine authorities. An information for homicide was filed against Binoy in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. He moved to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction. If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion? Why? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the Motion to Quash the Information should be granted. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime committed since it was committed on the high seas or outside of Philippine territory and on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines (US vs. Fowler, 1 Phil 614)

It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of her owner, which makes it a Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in Panama, the laws of Panama govern while it is in the high seas.


Use of Aliases; When Allowed (2006)

When can a Filipino citizen residing in this country use an alias legally? Give 3 instances. (2.5%)


SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1. Pseudonym for literary purposes.


2. Use of aliases in cinema and television entertainment.


3. In athletics and sports activities (RA. 6085).


4. Under the witness protection program a person may adopt a different identity (RA. 6981).


5. When he has been baptized or customarily known by such alias.



6. When authorized by a competent court (CA. No. 142, as amended by RA. 6085).


7. When properly indicated in a Certificate of Candidacy (Omnibus Election Code).

Criminal law bar questions and suggested answers from 1994-2006

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ANSWERS TO BAR  EXAMINATION QUESTIONS  IN

CRIMINAL LAW

ARRANGED BY TOPIC

(1994 – 2006)

Version 1973 – 2003

Edited  and  Arranged  by:

Janette Laggui-Icao and  Alex Andrew P. Icao

(Silliman University College of Law)

Updated by:

Dondee

ReTake BarOps 2007

From the ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS IN  CRIMINAL LAW by the UP LAW COMPLEX and PHILIPPINE  ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS

July 3, 2007